Ok, so the odds of the Colts scoring a TD if NE punts: 31% Odds the Patriots convert the 4th down and win right then and there: 60% is the historical 4th and 2 rate from the site Harpua linked. For the Patriots on that specific play it's probably higher, but whatever 60% Odds the Colts score a TD from your 30 if you fail to convert: What do you want to give me here? 50%? 60? 70? Either way 0.4 * 0.5= 20% 0.4 * 0.6 = 24% 0.4 * 0.7 = 28% Are the odds of you losing the game. Assuming the 4th down conversion rate is correct, you would have to believe that the Colts score at a 78% or greater clip when you fail, for it to be a "bad" decision.
link Too close to call. It's not the satisfying answer to the Great Belichick Debate, which has seen him declared by most observers to be either an infallible genius or overzealous tinkerer, but it's the most accurate one. Did he make the right decision? Too close to call. No matter how we fiddle with or adjust the probabilities to account for the game situation and the quality of the two offenses and defenses, it's difficult to find a dramatic difference between the choices of going for it or punting. Take the first option -- the one Bill Belichick chose. Teams attempting to convert a fourth-and-2 have successfully done so at a 48.6 percent rate this season, well down from 62.3 percent last season. The "true" likelihood of such a play being converted by an average team in an average situation is closer to that latter figure, based on historical data. Of course, the phrase "average team in an average situation" simply does not apply here. The Patriots don't have an average offense, they have the league's best DVOA; the Colts' defense ranks sixth. Although the Patriots had failed to convert in two of their three previous third-and-2 situations (including the one directly preceding the decision to go for it), their chances of making it in this situation were greater than the average team's. On the other hand, the probability has to be adjusted for the situation. Robert Mathis had been abusing right tackle Nick Kaczur all night, meaning Brady wouldn't have time for the combination of Randy Moss and Wes Welker to run anything resembling an intricate route pattern. Dwight Freeney lurked on the other side. Furthermore, the probability of a team going for it on fourth down might very well be artificially high because of selection bias -- teams are far more inclined to go for it on fourth down against the Lions or the Rams than against the Vikings or Ravens. Throw all these numbers into a big soup, stir them however you'd like and you'll end up with an expected conversion rate of about 60 percent. It might be 63, it might be 57; truthfully, it's not going to be enough to change our analysis. The Colts won't score every time they get the ball on the opposition's 29-yard line, but they will score most of the time. Toss in momentum and the quality of the Colts' offense versus the Patriots' secondary, and you can estimate, say, an 85 percent chance of the Colts scoring in that situation. That makes Belichick's decision to go for it a little stronger, upping the Patriots' chances of winning by going for it to maybe 66 percent. Then, it comes down to punting and where Manning gets the ball, which requires even more theoretical assumptions. Chris Hanson has a 39.6-yard net average, but the game was in a dome, and the Colts don't have great return units. If we just assume a 40-yard kick, the Colts get the ball on their 32-yard line with two minutes to go and one timeout. If you believe that the Colts had a 34 percent chance or better of scoring a touchdown in that situation (100 percent minus the 66 percent chance we mentioned a moment ago), Belichick was wrong. If you think the odds are worse than 34 percent, Belichick was right. If you disagree with the expected percentages of conversion above, Mike Harris of Football Outsiders has developed a nifty calculator that lets you plug in your own averages and figure out whether Belichick made the right call by those figures. You can find that calculator here. The key factor that the cacophony of responses seems to be missing is that you can't judge Belichick's decision by the fact that it didn't work. As we've mentioned more than once in these pages, you cannot judge decisions by their outcome. You have to consider the process that goes into them, and then decide whether they're right or wrong at the moment they're made. Think back to another controversial Belichick decision made in the heat of a prime-time game -- his decision to take a safety on purpose down one point during the fourth quarter of a Monday night game against the Broncos. Of course, the Patriots ended up getting the ball back and won the game. Belichick took virtually no flak after the game for his unconventional choice and was instead hailed as an aggressive, brilliant game manager. If Kevin Faulk had stumbled 2 feet forward, Belichick would be spoken about in those glowing tones today by virtually everyone now lining up to criticize him. That doesn't make his decision correct or incorrect, any more so than Faulk's coming up short does. If Belichick's decision was wrong, it was wrong from the moment the play call went to Tom Brady. And with everything we know about the situation, it's impossible to say whether that was truly the case.
I think when the coach basically tells the defense they don't have a prayer it kills the hope that they had of stopping Indy, and I need to see something a lot better than random stats that some guy that was bored calculated, in other words I'm not buying your 60% number
So you're not classy if you're really upset after a loss? Belichik shook the other HC's hand, and Brady shook Manning's hand. I'd rather see that than the smiles and chitchat most people do. After a terrible loss, you are supposed to feel like shit, and if you don't, maybe you don't hate losing enough.
if your D takes the field dependent on hope, not determined and prepared to simply execute, you're in trouble to begin with. somehow, I don't think a Belichick D plays with hope or are brooding about him not having faith in them once that ball is snapped.
I disagree with the Pats decision. But I'd have been really happy if they got the 1st down. Their defense was gassed from 3 quarters of no huddle, and only two healthy d'linemen. Belichik gave his thoughts. I decided if we didn't get it on 3rd down that we were going on 4th. I thought it was our best chance to win the game. Asked if he'd do it again in hindsight, he said you only get one chance to make the decision. He said that it was fair to question his decision, and the call was on him, and the confusion that made them take the last TO due to confusion about the punt team coming on the field was on him. He also said when asked if he thought Faulk got the 1st down, it doesn't matter what I think. He's being pretty stand up about it I think.
Well if your own coach doesn't have any hope for your defense then they are in trouble I mean seriously what does he tell his defense, well I'd rather risk a 4th down up 6 points inside of my own 30 yard line then think that you can stop Manning once with less than 2 mins left on the clock with 1 TO left, it would sound about as awe inspiring as a Mangini motivational speech.
they should have run it twice then. If Schottenhiemer had called those plays, we'd have crucified him for it.
It would have been Ryan getting skewered as well, because Shot wouldn't get to call a play unless Ryan decided not to punt. I guess he saw history repeatng itself... http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/11/16/belichick/ In his weekly radio appearance on WEEI, Belichick was a little more revealing. He provided a window into the decision to go for it on fourth-and-two from New England's 28-yard line late in the game when he mentioned another Patriots-Colts game that took play in Indianapolis. "It came to, if we had made that play, we would have been able to run out all or most of the clock so we didn't need very much, we felt good about the play," Belichick said. "We've been on the other side of that one, it's basically where we were in the AFC Championship game. We've done it both ways and we tried to win the game on that play and it didn't work out." Belichick is referring to the classic AFC Championship game following the 2006 season. In that game, the Patriots punted to the Colts with two minutes and 17 seconds left rather than go for a fourth and four from their own 46-yard line. 75 seconds later, Joseph Addai scored the game-winning touchdown. Perhaps that experience influenced Belichick's decision.
The 60% is the historical figure of decades and decades of attempts when you face 4th and 2, ie. it represents the conversion rate of your average offense vs your average defense. The Patriots are obviously much better than the average NFL offense which is why Belichick correctly reasoned that in the first component of the equation, he was way ahead.
There's a school of thought that basically says that giving up the ball is the worst thing that can happen to you on a possession. Some guys at the University of Chicago's School of Business did a study awhile back that basically weighted the odds of scoring from any point on the field in any given situation. Possession of the football was by far the biggest factor in whether or not you were going to score and keeping it away from the opponent was the biggest factor in determining whether or not they were likely to score. The study basically said that if you had a significant chance, and I do not recall what that number was so I'm not going to quote it, to maintain possession on 4th down from almost anywhere on the field you were better off going for the 1st down than punting the ball away. The study also noted that pressures unrelated to the football field, like the media getting in your face and peer pressure from other coaches who would not follow the odds because they looked worse than they were, was the most likely reason that coaches had continually engaged in self-defeating behavior by punting the ball away on 4th and 1 to 3 - thus handing their opponents a competitive advantage by giving them the most important thing in the game: possession of the football. With Belichik we're seeing exactly what the economists were talking about. He's getting harrassed for trying to win the game against Peyton Manning in the 4th quarter by keeping the ball out of his hands. There's almost no question that the Patriot's odds on getting 2 yards on that play were better than their odds on keeping Manning and the Colts out of the endzone if they punted the ball away. Given the amount of time left in the game there was a pretty good chance that Manning and the Colts would be going into the endzone at just the point that the Patriots could not respond with another drive. It was the right move. Note by the way that if the Patriots make the 2 yards they can run the clock down and probably win outright. All they had to do was make the 2 yards. At the end of the play they were at the 2 minute warning.
Belichick barely shook the coach's hand and then one of his coach's threw a camera guy to the ground. I get your point, but there's such a thing as class, win or lose. Brady couldn't run off the field fast enough. As I pointed out in my original post, this shit is overrated, but having played an assortment of sports in my life, is it that hard to shake hands with the guy and simply say "nice game?" It's not that fucking hard, it's called sportsmanship and there's a reason why it's taught to kids at the age of 5. I forgot though, ESPN and networks like that teach kids, the only way to get on a replay is to showboat, beat your chest, slash your throat, party like a rock star after batting down a pass you should have intercepted, getting into a shoving match or actually exchanging punches to get on the ever loving TV. The more they show, the more watered down it gets. I can't even see a player make a simple tackle or run for a 5-yard gain without getting up and doing some kind of a dance. Players like Walter Payton and even Curtis Martin can't win because they don't act like that. Maybe at the "old" age of 32, I'm s little old fashioned, but this is just another example of all this. I mention all of this, because the Patriots are such a classy organization. When they win. sometimes. Class starts with your coach, and the man quite simply, even though he's a great coach who took a gamble in this situation, has none. zero. sorry, i pointed it out. You can lose with class, no matter how fucking pissed you may be about it. It's called maturity. Sorry for the rant.
I think it should also be mentioned that Faulk clearly had possession before he hit the turf, which means he should have been given forward progress and given the first down. Belichick didn't have any timeouts so they couldn't challenge, so the refs pretty much cost the them the game. Not that I'm complaining.
The play happened before the 2 min warning, and Faulk's bobble of the ball couldn't give him the initial forward progress
"What was Belicheat thinking?" What was he thinking? He was thinking what can I do to piss my team off bad enough that they go out and score 100 points against the Jets next week.
The defense already failed to stop Manning from going 70 yards on consecutive drives. The way Belichick saw it, he had an offense that included Tom Brady, Wes Welker, Randy Moss, one of the most effective short yardage backs in Kevin Faulk, and a great offensive line. The four of those guys plus the OLine can get two yards. If Faulk had caught this pass cleanly, ran his route one yard deeper, or if Belichick still had one timeout left to call the challenge, he would have made the right call. He makes these calls all of the time and is, rightfully, called a genius for it. For once, the call didn't go his way. And how about some credit to the defense that stopped this play? Melvin Bullitt's coverage forcing Faulk to shorten his route, and the hit that forced him inside the 1st down marker is what made this play for the Colts.
Faulk did a double-catch but he didn't bobble it. Once he reeled it in, he had possession. That happened right before his left foot came down.. look at the clip again.
